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Abstract 
The failure of modern science to create a common scientific framework 
for nature and consciousness makes it necessary to look for broader 
foundations in a new philosophy. Although controversial for modern 
science, the Peircean semiotic, evolutionary, pragmatic and triadic 
philosophy has been the only modern conceptual framework that can 
support that transdisciplinary change in our view of knowing that bridges 
the two cultures and transgresses Cartesian dualism. It therefore seems 
ideal to build on it for modern biosemiotics and can, in combination with 
Luhmann’s theory of communication, encompass modern information 
theory, complexity science and thermodynamics. It allows focus on the 
connection between the concept of codes and signs in living systems, 
and makes it possible to re-conceptualize both internal and external 
processes of the human body, mind and communication in models that fit 
into one framework. 
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Introduction 
Semiotics (from the Greek word for sign) is a transdisciplinary study and doctrine 
of signs in general including signification, perception, communication, codes, 
media , language and the sign systems used parallel with language. Another way 
to define it is as the science of signs and their life in society. 
 
Code is broadly defined as: everything of a more systematic/orderly nature that 
the source and the receiver need to know a priori about the relation between the 
signs in a message both in analogue and digital form, and the area of reality they 
refer to in order to interpret it. Codes are not universal in the way we expect 
natural laws to be, but are related to meaningful relations between two different 
areas of reality in specific contexts and related to specific interests. Thus DNA is 
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only a code for amino acid sequences in proteins inside a living cell in an 
environment of RNA, Ribosomes and a numerous specific enzymes, and 
promoting factors just like language codes only work in specific cultural contexts. 
 
Although one can trace the origins of semiotics to the classical Greek period, 
and follow important developments in the Middle Ages, modern semiotics 
developed in the 19th century with Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) and semiology 
with Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), working independently of each other. 
But both see sign study as a more comprehensive and general framework than 
linguistics. Semiotics, including the semiology of Saussure is the study of all 
sign systems, including non-verbal, paralinguistic and machine codes. It studies 
how something comes to stand for something else for somebody in certain 
situations in a certain way:  
1. As the word ‘blue’ stands for a certain range of color, but also has come to    
stand for an emotional state.  
2. As the flag is a sign for the nation (a symbol).  
3. As a shaken fist can be a sign of anger.  
4. As the red spots on the skin can be a sign for small pox. 
5. As the wagging of the dog’s tail can be a sign of friendliness for both dogs 
and humans.  
6. As pheromones can be a sign of heat to the other sex of the species. 
7. As the hormone oxytocine from the pituitary can be a sign to the cells in the 
lactating glands of the breast to release the milk (into the baby’s mouth).  
 
Two basic semiotic paradigms 
Thus semiotics has two major paradigms: 
1. A  mostly French structuralist one, usually called semiology, originating in the 
Swiss Ferdinand de Saussure’s posthumous published Course in General 
Linguistics (trans., 1972 org. 1916). In his linguistics Saussure redefines and 
describes the linguistic "sign" in functionalist terms as the union of a concept 
(the signified) and a sound image (signifier). The linguistic sign is more a 
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process than a thing. It is a mental relationship between a sound pattern 
(signal/signifier) and a concept (signified/signification). The signifier is the 
sound pattern. The image of the object in the mind is called the signified. He 
writes that a "linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but 
between a concept and a sound pattern. The sound pattern is not actually a 
sound; for a sound is something physical. A sound pattern is the hearer's 
psychological impression of a sound." (Saussure 1972, p. 66). Thus Saussure 
refers to the "psychological impression of a sound" as the "signal/signifier" and 
to the "concept" as the " signification/signified" (Harris/Baskin translations), and 
it is the link between them that comprises the sign. It is a relation from one 
abstract entity to another, and the relation between these cognitive structures 
constitutes the sign.  The relation to objects in the world is not made very clear, 
as the language is first of all seen as a system in itself as there are no universal 
fixed ideas, no universal conceptual objects, since these change from one 
language to another. Therefore the signified is arbitrary too. 
Their coupling is functional as neither the signified nor the signifier is the 
"cause" of the other. Their relation is arbitrary and determined by cultural 
convention. There is no natural or logical relation between a particular sound 
image and a concept. The sign is a compound of a word that signifies, and the 
idea in the mind which is the signified. Saussure held that words and other 
language elements (signifiers) bore no sensual or formal connection with the 
things indicated (signified) and indicated only by means of the structural role of 
the word within the whole language.   
Thus the basic element of language is defined relationally and the reason we 
can recognize different occurrences of a word is its place as an element in the 
system of the "structural whole," of language, which he calls ‘Langue’. Any 
individual unit or speech act dependent on that system (signs such as words or 
concepts) he calls ‘Parole’. Langue can only arise in social relations. It takes a 
community to set up the relations between any particular sound image and any 
particular concepts (Parole). The individual cannot make this, as there can be 
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no private languages, but has to make a kind of contract with Parole in order to 
express him/herself to others. 
 There are two places where a mental process is taking place: when speaking 
between the "mind" and the mouth, and when listening between the ears and 
the "mind". It seems that both processes are a pairing between a sound and a 
concept. Semiology rests on the assumption that both the processes are 
governed by the same set of principles based on Saussure's notion of the 
"linguistic sign". It is interesting that Saussure wanted to examine systematically 
the problem of chance as the inevitable foundation of everything, focusing on 
the material facts and interdependence of chance and meaning, not losing 
himself in a search for hidden meanings and avoiding all the problems arising 
from consciousness (see Saussure 1997). He sees thought as a shapeless 
mass, which is only ordered by language.  
 Saussure’s aim with his semiology was to go beyond linguistic science and to 
study the life of signs within society. His work emphasises cultural codes and 
structures, plus literary artifacts constituted by those structures or articulated by 
them. It is mainly used in linguistic, cultural studies and analysis. It was 
developed by Louis Hjemslev (1899-1965) who created glossematics, Roman 
Jakobson  (1896-1982) with his semiotic linguistics, Algirdas J. Griemas’ 
structural Semantics, Roland Barthes (1915-1980) and his text semiotics 
demonstrated in his Mythologies (how clothes, advertisements, sports, and 
many other objects and forms of behavior are systems of signs which can be 
analyzed and interpreted in order to understand their social implications). 
Umberto Eco has developed a general semiotics that blends aspects of 
Saussurean semiology with Peircean semiotics. The application of Saussure’s  
terminology in biology is mostly influenced by the work of M. Florkin (1974), but 
also by Roman Jakobson (1971).  
 
Semiologists would usually not accept examples 3-6 above as genuine signs, 
because they are not self-consciously intentional human acts. It is worth noting 
those semiologists are not phenomenological in their approach. They are 
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(social) structuralists and view language as the most basic social system. They 
consider semiology to be the study of the systems of rules and conventions, 
which enable social and cultural phenomena viewed as signs. In literary theory, 
semiotics is the analysis of text in terms of its use of language as dependent on 
and influenced by literary conventions and modes of discourse.  
 
Often you see the terms "semiotics" and "semiology" used interchangeably. But 
here we have distinguished between the two paradigms. Originally the followers 
of Peirce wanted to use his term ‘semeiotic’, but like semiology it has not had 
“staying power”. We thus put semiotics to be the super term for them both. 
Starting in the 1990s, the key biosemioticians have used the approach of the 
semiotics of C. S. Peirce as the philosophical basis to their development of 
biosemiotics (Hoffmeyer and Emmeche 1991; Hoffmeyer 1996, 2005).  
But it is worth noting that, for instance Markos (2002), uses Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, Witzany (1993) uses Habermas’ pragmatics of language as a 
philosophical foundation, and Barbieri (2001/ 2003) characterizes his own work 
as biosemantics, but has recently put it under the heading of biosemiotics, 
developing then a theory that features a concept of biological meaning that is 
neither Saussurian, nor Peircean, as we shall return to below.  
The problem I see in making a biosemiotic paradigm founded on views like this 
is that one would need to argue for nature or at least living systems to have a 
basic linguistic dynamics. But I think, this waters down the concept of language 
to an unacceptable degree. Further, since the concepts of semiology and 
semiotics have already been invented by virtue of the necessity of having more 
general frameworks than linguistics to deal with signification and communication 
systems that cannot live up to the more advanced definitions of being a 
language as such, I see no reason to make an already difficult task any more 
difficult. Many semioticians from the humanities and social sciences still find 
that biosemiotics waters down the concept of semiosis. 
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Another view would be that the linguistic or hermeneutic view is just a useful 
metaphor and we are not to take claims of truth as seriously as in classical 
science, logical positivism and analytical philosophy. We only look for 
coherence in meanings, not for any foundational statements about truth 
conditions. We live in a time when researchers in major parts of social science 
and the humanities might say that the right understanding of scientific 
knowledge (broadly speaking) is no longer something like "justified true belief" 
as Plato stated it, but instead "the construction of power relations." Principles of 
skepticism and the rejection of the possibility of knowledge seems to have 
become a truism to many people both inside philosophy and outside, that truth 
claims in science are social constructions with their own conventions and 
arbitrariness. Thus a metaphorical model is OK if it is “useful”. But this would 
mean that the quest for commonly true knowledge as an over all construction of 
common knowledge models turns into a quest for constructing models and 
theories to be used to express one's political/ religious/ 
economic/race/class/gender consciousness and interest. All that is left is 
different forms and combinations of power and meaning games in a post-
modern age.  
I think this is a dangerous path to tread for a democratic society based on 
power division and functionally differentiated systems as it is, and science being 
a very important one of them side by side with law, money, power, religion and 
art. Further I believe that there are good reasons for it not being true. Kuhn, 
Feyerabend, Popper, Lakatos, Peirce, and many of the post-modern and STS 
(science technology studies) thinkers were right and wrong at the same time. 
They all described dubious aspects of what scientists did, but each ignored 
other aspects. Yes, science can too easily be led by background assumptions 
that are not objective. Yes, there is no 'one thing' that is the scientific method, 
and science is a much messier and stranger affair than many scientists want to 
admit, leaving too much room for mis-steps. But science is still a discipline 
worth pursuing, although there is no one method that can encapsulate it and 
despite the fact that it does demand some kind of critical realism and 
pragmatism to believe that. If one thinks, like many radical and social 
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constructivists, that the world is a continuum only carved up by words and/or 
social practices then one is not able to uphold any kind of theory of truth and 
representation. Though the world is very much process-like, one has to grant it 
structures to have any kind of cognitive theory. The founder of second order 
cybernetics, Heinz von Foerster, recognized this (see Brier 1996b) and created 
a good compromise with his theory of Eigenvalues in a self-organizing evolving 
nature. He writes: 
 
Eigenvalues have been found ontologically to be discrete, stable, separable 
and composable, while ontogenetically to arise as equilibria that determine 
themselves through circular processes. Ontologically, Eigenvalues and 
objects, and likewise, ontogenetically, stable behavior and the manifestation 
of a subject's “grasp” of an object cannot be distinguished. (Von Foerster 
2003, p. 266) 
                                                  
This self-organizing behavior is seen both in natural processes in chemical and 
ecological evolution as well as in the gestalt characteristics of cognition as such. 
Von Foerster saw that the ecological niche and the organism’s cognition of its 
surrounding – what I call its ‘signification sphere’ – is an interdependent co-
evolution. The stabilization of the processes here between the constraints 
produced by whatever stable process forms self-organization in evolution allows 
and the possible eigen-values that can be established by a cognitive system’s 
motivated interpretations is what makes signs possible. He writes: 
 
There is an additional point I want to make, an important point. Out of an 
infinite continuum of possibilities, recursive operations carve out a precise 
set of discrete solutions. Eigen-behavior generates discrete, identifiable 
entities. Producing discreteness out of infinite variety has incredibly 
important consequences. It permits us to begin naming things. Language 
is the possibility of carving out of an infinite number of possible 
experiences those experiences which allow stable interactions of your-self 
with yourself. (von Foerster in Segal 2001, p. 127-128) 
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This is a good foundation for an understanding of Peircean semiotics and it also 
helps us to look at science through a crossword metaphor instead of seeing a 
linear development or a total fragmentation (Haack 1998). Some questions 
(entries) may partially help with other questions (intersecting entries). 
Sometimes one answer turns out to be false (a wrongly filled in entry) and 
misleads scientists on others (as the wrong entry provides a wrong 'clue' to the 
other). Scientists must then backtrack to figure out how much of the 'puzzle' has 
been filled in correctly and how much can be left as is. The important thing is 
that science is not a linear pattern per se, but consists of many different and not 
always connected entries that assist with and are assisted or destroyed by 
intersecting entries. We can therefore say that the scientific process is, when 
used properly, as objective a method as one can get, but it is not in anyway a 
straightforward simple process. Nevertheless, science has achieved 
overwhelming success in discovering true things rather than simply inventing or 
constructing them.  
In opposition to postmodernism and coherentism is a view one could call 
‘foundationalism’. It is the view that a system of meaning and interpretation 
cannot be solipsistically self-contained but must at some point have a 
cognitively significant form of contact with external  - at least partly -independent 
reality. One cannot suspend judgment on whether there is a priori knowledge or 
not, since nothing less than a metaphysical theory of (also a priori) knowledge 
can provide an explanation of how empirical objects are cognitively available for 
our inspection in experience - how it is possible that we can reflect on our sense 
experiences. But it is, on the other hand, also important to realize that the 
relationship between subject and object is not a causal relationship in the 
physical sense. The actual objects of empirical knowledge, the phenomenal 
objects, must to a certain degree themselves be contents of consciousness, 
and therefore available for inspection in a non-causal relationship between 
subject and object, which is the way it is viewed in semiotics. As such, this 
philosophy is consistent with Peirce’s semiotic philosophy. Foundationalism 
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thus draws its strength from insights about truth and the significance of 
knowledge, as opposed to opinion or fiction theories only based on coherentism 
which cannot distinguish these things and therefore have given up any concept 
of truth, as in much phenomenology, hermeneutics, discourse analysis and 
structuralist semiology, which only focus on the unpacking of history and 
presuppositions of the semantic terms. The philosophical analysis of the 
concept of truth is a very deep and complicated thing that has to include an 
evolutionary pragmatism as Peirce saw it; but that does not make us or him 
leave Aristotle’s view that truth is to say of what is that it is and of what is not 
that it is not. 
I will therefore here argue for the Peircean approach in its late pragmaticistic 
version, where he turns his critique on superficial pragmatism (see for instance 
Haack 1998). This pragmatic philosophy still meets the standards of a 
philosophical view in not giving up at least a version of the correspondence 
theory of truth deeply intertwined with Peirce’s semiotics. To this I will add what 
I consider necessary and useful elements from the autopoiesis theory in the 
form Luhmann has used in his system theoretical communication-based 
sociology, in order better to be able to understand the differences and relations 
between the biological, the psychological, and the social communicative 
systems in humans and their societies. 
 
2. So, the second main paradigm in semiotics is the triadic, American, 
pragmaticistic, transdisciplinary, evolutionary doctrine originating in the work of 
Peirce. As Peirce’s semiotics is the only sign study that deals systematically 
with non-intentional signs of the body and of nature at large, accepting 
examples 3-6 above as genuine semiosis, it has become the main source for 
semiotic contemplations of the similarities and differences of signs of inorganic 
nature, signs of living systems, including diagnostics of medicine, as well as 
signs of machines (especially computer semiotics, see the groundbreaking book 
of Bøgh Andersen 1990).  
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To develop his fundamental theory of semiosis Peirce designed a philosophical 
alternative to both the dualism of rationalism and the materialistic monism of 
most empirical science. He combined realism and idealism into an objective 
idealism1, then combined this with synechism, the view that the basic “stuff” of 
reality is continuous, manifesting as both mind and matter, an evolutionary 
ontology (process view) and a pragmatic epistemology.  
 
His world view can therefore be summed up as one of evolutionary objective 
idealistic social pragmatic realism. Reality is what affects our world of bio-social 
signification. Things cannot therefore be more real than signs, because signs 
can also be objects. The same applies to laws. If something is so persistent that 
we refer to it as an object/thing, then there must be stable habits (“laws”) 
connected to it, as well as qualities that make it possible for us to understand it.  
 
Peirce's consideration of the relationship between the human and nature 
presupposes that the analogies between human thought and the “thought”-
habits of nature are valid. These analogies are based upon the commonalities 
of the (semiotic) forces that make things happen.  
 
Peirce's semiotics embeds logic within it. But Peirce's interest in science and 
epistemology led him in directions different from those taken by Frege. All 
symbols have an indexical component, and signs such as sentences have to be 
analyzed as multifunctional semiotic expressions. Thus he does not create the 
split between logic and indexicality that plagues the langue-parole dichotomy 
troubling Saussure. Predicates describe qualities or states of affairs, while 
indices point to objects, external reality, or aspects of their context of use. 
                                                 
1 Objective idealism is the view that existence consists, fundamentally, of a vast mental 
"absolute." It is a metaphysics that postulates that there is in an important sense only 
one perceiver and that this perceiver is one with that, which is perceived, at least in the 
beginning, before it split up in an absolute or transcendental aspect and a relative aspect 
in time and space. In some philosophies these are then absolutely separated. In Peirce’s 
theory they are connected through his principle of synechism, which then connects the 
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The value of an icon consists in its exhibiting the features of a state of 
things regarded as if it were purely imaginary. The value of an index is that 
it assures us of positive fact. The value of a symbol is that it serves to 
make thought and conduct rational and enables us to predict the future. ... 
the most perfect of signs are those in which the iconic, indicative, and 




Peircean biosemiotics is based on Peirce’s theory of mind as a basic part of 
reality, (in Firstness) existing in the material aspect of reality, (in Secondness) 
as the “inner aspect of matter” (hylozoism) manifesting itself as awareness and 
experience in animals, and finally as consciousness in humans. Combining this 
with a general systems theory of emergence, self-organization and 
closure/autopoiesis, it forms an explicit theory of how the inner world of an 
organism is constituted and, therefore, how first-person views are possible and 
just as real as matter. Through this foundation for semiosis, a theory of meaning 
and interpretation including mind -- at least as immanent in nature -- is possible; 
and cybernetic views of information as well as autopoietic views on ‘languaging’ 
can be combined with pragmatic theories of language in the biosemiotic 
perspective. Propositions are viewed meta-indexically in that they represent the 
predicates of the objects pointed out by indices, in contrast to Saussure’s much 
more logomorphic and logocentric semiology. The barrier between the empirical 
content – here in form of the indexicality  - and logical form, which is also 
problematic in classical and analytical philosophy of logic, does not exist for 
Peirce, as the indexical aspect is built into all referring terms, and classical logic 
is a part of semiotics. Thus this makes hypotheses about them empirical 
testable2. 
                                                 
2 Peirce invented the term ‘abduction’ as a description of how we first come to our 
ideas, concepts, and hypotheses about the world, and this is essentially the semiotic 
process where we connect representamens with objects through creating our 
interpretants. From this we deduct consequences of our abduction, and then test them 
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Peircean (bio)-semiotics is distinct from other semiotic paradigms in that it not 
only deals with intentional signs of communication, but also encompasses non-
intentional signs such as symptoms of the body and patterns of inanimate 
nature. Peircean semiotics breaks with the traditional dualistic epistemological 
problem of first-order science by framing its basic concept of cognition, 
signification, within a triadic semiotic philosophy. The triadic semiotics is 
integrated into a theory of continuity between mind and matter (Synechism) 
where the three basic categories (Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness) are 
not only inside the perceiver’s mind, but also in the nature perceived. This is 
connected to the second important ontological belief in Peirce’s philosophy, 
namely Tychism, which sees chance and chaos as basic characteristics of 
Firstness. This is combined with an evolutionary theory of mind (Agapism), 
where mind has a tendency to form habits in nature.  
Chaos and chance is seen as a First, which is not to be explained further (for 
instance, by regularities). It is the basis of habit forming and evolution. The 
chaos of Firstness is not seen as the lack of law, as it is in mechanicism and 
rationalism, but as something full of potential qualities to be manifested 
individually in Secondness, and as general habits and knowledge in dynamic 
objects and semiosis in Thirdness (Peirce 1992).This is an alternative to 
viewing knowledge either as justified true belief or causally produced or as in 
contemporary approaches to language that derive from Turing machine 
analogies or computer models.  
                                                                                                                                               
empirical and evaluate them inductively. Through his understanding of the interacting 
roles of abduction, induction, and deduction in a social process of scientific inquiry a 
semiotic and logical process becomes a public, self-correcting process. Reality is that 
which the community of inquirers would ultimately agree upon as true, not arbitrarily 
socially constructivisticly, but because we have a deep connection to reality through the 
categories and evolution.  Saussure’s theory of language relies implicitly much more on 
a rationalist theory of meaning and consciousness, since its notion of sign is based on 
the idea that signs represent ideas which precede any actual utterances, and are 
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Peircean semiotics differs from those approaches, which start with logical form 
and then ask how it gets instantiated by language or mental processes. Instead, 
his semiotic pragmatistic philosophy links these processes to his epistemology 
of abduction and reasoning to the best explanatory hypothesis. This sees the 
development of knowledge as a dynamic relation between belief, doubt, desire, 
and inquiry, and the self-correcting nature of semiosis. Beliefs are certain 
behavioral dispositions that manifest themselves in a given context based on 
certain desires. They may be changed through processes of inference, which 
change our representations of the world. Truth and reality, thus, to a certain 
extent, depend on the social construction of inquiry. But, on the other hand in 
his triadic evolutionary view, semiosis can be viewed as self-correcting in its 
reproduction of Thirdness. This is the deep evolutionary foundation of Peirce’s 
pragmatism that fits so well with biological evolutionary and ecological thinking, 
but provides an alternative to “selfish genes” and other reductionistic genetic 
approaches, and hopefully can help us to connect genes and biological 
functionality in a more fruitful way. 
The semiotic threshold in biosemiotics 
Ever since Umberto Eco (1976) formulated the problem of the “semiotic 
threshold,” semiotics -- especially Peircean semiotics -- has developed further 
into the realm of biology. As a result of the innovative work of Thomas Sebeok, 
Peirce’s semiotics is now interpreted as covering all living signifying systems in 
biosemiotics. The efforts of Thomas Sebeok (1920- 2001) ( see for instance 
Sebeok 1976, 1986, 1989; and  Petrilli and Ponzio 2001 for a short history) 
have led to the development of a biosemiotics encompassing all living systems, 
including plants and micro-organisms, as sign users. I have listed Sebeok’s 
major works in animal communication and biosemiotics in the reference list. 
 
Sebeok's name is associated most of all with the term zoösemiotics, the study 
of animal sign use. It was coined in 1963, and it deals with species-specific 
communication systems, and their signifying behavior.  Zoösemiotics is 
concerned more with a synchronic perspective than an ethologic one, which 
focuses primarily on the diachronic dimension. The transmission of information 
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among animals was, for instance, the subject of the book Animal 
Communication (1968), which Sebeok edited. His research succeeded in 
broadening the definition of semiotics beyond human language and culture to 
encompassing human non-verbal communication as well as communication 
between, and sign processes within, all living organisms. Later, Sebeok decided 
that zoösemiotics rests on a more comprehensive science of biosemiotics. This 
global conception of semiotics – namely biosemiotics - equates life with sign 
interpretation or mediation. He was most proud of having inspired a group of 
theoretical biologists and semioticians to pursue this field of investigation. 
 
Although biosemiotics was already prefigured in Jakob von Uexküll's 
Umweltlehre, Sebeok fruitfully combined the influences of von Uexküll and 
Charles S. Peirce, and merged them into an original whole, in an evolutionary 
perspective, arriving at the thesis that symbiosis and semiosis are one and the 
same. Biosemiotics finds its place as a master-science, which in the animal 
cognition and communication area encompass the parallel disciplines of 
ethology and developmental psychology. 
 
As Uexküll was one of Konrad Lorenz’ most important teachers, the ethology he 
and Tinbergen developed fitted nicely as a part of biosemiotics. In von Uexküll’s 
writings one finds the roots of important concepts such as sign stimuli, innate 
release mechanisms, and motivation, later utilized in Lorenz’ ethological 
research program. As previously discussed in Brier (2001a), von Uexküll’s 
“tone” becomes Lorenz’ “motivation,” the “sign stimuli” in ethology becomes the 
“subjectively defined object,” and the “IRM” becomes the “functional relation 
between receptors and effectors.” But it is clear that von Uexküll’s bio-
cybernetic concepts differ from the partially mechanistic framework found in the 
theoretical foundation of Lorenz and Tinbergen’s articles from around 1950. 
About “tone”, von Uexküll writes the following: 
The Umwelt only acquires its admirable surety for animals if we include the 
functional tones in our contemplation of it. We may say that the number of 
objects that an animal can distinguish in its own world equals the number 
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of functions it can carry out. If, along with few functions, it possesses few 
functional images, its world, too, will consist of few objects. As a result its 
world is indeed poorer, but all the more secure. (von Uexkül 1957, p. 49) 
 
Von Uexküll’s “tone” concept is the root of Lorenz’ specific motivation – but it 
seems more closely related to Gibson’s affordances, although it is unclear 
whether Gibson ever read von Uexküll. nevertheless it is important to underline 
that Jakob von Uexküll’s framework is behavioral and functionalistic like the 
cybernetics his functional cycle with its feedback system was inspired by. He is 
in no way to be considered a bio-phenomenologist. 
 
Jakob von Uexküll’s type of theory is very much like Maturana and Varela’s 
(1980) autopoiesis and Bateson’s cybernetic ecological mind theory (Bateson 
1972). There is no theory of first person experience, or the origin of qualia, 
feeling and willing. He always, like the cyberneticians, underlines the functional 
aspect. Bateson’s ‘pattern that connects’ is “The Lonely Skeleton of Truth”, as 
he calls it in a poem in Angels Fear. His ‘mind’ is a cybernetic feedback and 
homeostatic cybernetic goal oriented system like a thermostat acting on 
‘differences’. Thus it is my view that Peirce’s semiotic philosophy delivers the 
missing element to both von Uexküll’s philosophy of science and Lorenzian 
ethology, providing a post-mechanistic explanation (Brier 2008). 
 
The empiricist and natural science readings Sebeok offers for communication 
were new to the semiotic field. References to animal models are made 
throughout his work in the context of ethology. The approaches of ethology and 
sociobiology have been controversial and, in their applicability to human culture 
and society, accused of reductionism. Sebeok shows that some of this 
controversy may find itself played out in the new transdisciplinary framework of 
biosemiotics. In 1992 he and his wife Jean Umiker-Sebeok published The 
Semiotic Web 1991 as a volume titled Biosemiotics. This volume was 
predicated on a book they edited in 1980, Speaking of Apes, which presented a 
detailed critical evaluation of current investigations of the ability of apes to learn 
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language. Sebeok showed in a profound critique of the way the experiments 
were constructed that it is very doubtful that apes have such capabilities. This 
work and its profound consequences are summed up and developed further in 
the collection, Life Signs (2000). Thus biosemiotics does not entail that there 
are no significant differences between man and apes. 
 
Sebeok argued that the biosphere and the semiosphere are linked in a closed 
cybernetic loop, where meaning itself powers creation in self-excited circuits. 
This is a thinking that clearly encompasses the similar ideas as are considered 
in second-order cybernetics (von Foerster), autopoiesis theory of Maturana and 
Varela (1980), Niklas Luhmann (1995) and enaction theory of Varela, 
Thompson. and Rosch (1992) 
 
Sebeok founded biosemiotics through a Peircean reinterpretation of Jakob von 
Uexküll’s Umweltslehre. In the last 20 years of his life he worked in 
collaboration with, among others, the Copenhagen and Tartu Schools of 
Biosemiotics3. Thus this semiotic doctrine accepts also non-consciously-
intentional signs in humans (example no. 3) and between animals (nos. 5 and 
6) as well as between animals and humans (no. 4), non-intentional signs (no. 
4), and signs between organs and cells in the body (no. 7) called 
endosemiotics, (Uexküll et. al. 1993) for instance a special area of 
immunosemiotics dealing with the immunological code, immunological memory 
and recognition (Sebeok 1997a, 2001c). The way that we now know that the 
nervous system, the hormone system and the immunological system’s 
communicative codes work on each other is considered to be the basis of the 
biological self: an endosemiotic self-organized cybernetic system with 
homeostasis. Maybe it was better named the biosemiotic self? 
 
But biosemiotics does not only deal with animals in zoösemiotics, it also deals 
with signs in plants: phytosemiotics (Krampen 1981), as well as with bacterial 
communication. According to one standard scheme for the broad classification 
                                                 
3 Jesper Hoffmeyer, Claus Emmeche, Frederik Stjernfelt and Søren Brier in Copenhagen and Kalevi Kull  
at the Jakob von Uexküll  centre in Tartu. and at Tartu university. 
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of organisms, five super kingdoms are now distinguished: protists; bacteria; 
plants; animals; and fungi, thus the major classification categories in 
biosemiotics are according to Deely (1990): bacteriosemiotics, protistosemio-
tics, phytosemiotics, mycosemiotics, and zoösemiotics.  
 
Within zoösemiotics the Peircean antroposemiotics encompasses the traditional 
semiotics of language and culture mostly inspired by Saussure. There has, at 
the Gatherings in Biosemiotics conferences, been some discussion of 
anthroposemiotics and with it the semiotics of language should be seen as a 
special part of biosemiotics - as I endorse - or  should be considered to be an 
area outside biosemiotics. Thus biosemiotics could be seen as a new 
foundation for biology, or as a supplement to the mechanistic and informational 
ones.  Asking Hoffmeyer if this was the right interpretation of his view - as 
expressed in Hoffmeyer (2007) - he corrected my text to the following:  
 
According to Hoffmeyer anthroposemiotics deals with levels of semiotic 
freedom far beyond anything known in the pre-human world, and for that 
reason anthroposemiotics requires research strategies that are radically 
different from those of biosemiotics proper. Anthroposemiotics, however, 
cannot escape the fact that human semiotic interactions are evolutionarily 
rooted in much simpler biosemiotic interaction patterns, and this fact must 
be reflected in the foundational understanding of anthroposemiotic 
research, whatever kind it is.  
 
Thus Hoffmeyer sees unity on the ontological level including the consequences 
of an evolutionary view, as Peirce does, but qualitative differences on the 
epistemological level because the semiotic freedom changes radically when we 
move into the level of symbol use in language where the directionality is now 
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Agreeing with Hoffmeyer on these points I still think that that there are also 
important epistemological continuities between the zoösemiotic and the 
antroposemiotics levels in the form of the understanding of knowledge coming 
from Peirce’s philosophy of the three categories, his theory of abduction and its 
connection to deduction and induction. 
 
There has been a well-known debate about the concepts of primary and 
secondary modelling systems (see, e.g., Sebeok and Danesi 2000) in 
linguistics, which have now been changed by biosemiotics. Originally language 
was seen as the primary modeling system, whereas culture comprised the 
secondary one. But through biosemiotics Sebeok has argued that there exists a 
nonverbal zoösemiotic system as the foundation of human language, which has 
to be called the primary one, thus language becomes the secondary, and 
culture the tertiary (e.g., Sebeok 1994). The ethology developed by Lorenz 
(1970-71) and Tinbergen (1973) from the 1920’s on (inspired by Jakob von 
Uexküll) has for a long time pointed out that some animal species react to 
certain aspects of nature or other animals as signs to be interpreted in fixed 
action patterns, and that animals communicate with these in a ritualized form 
giving some of them a symbolic character. In addition to directly biosemiotic 
problems, Sebeok also touches, in some of his writings, on the area of 
representations of (and approaches to) nature in cultures nowadays known as 
ecosemiotics  (Nöth 1998). This should be taken as different from biosemiotics, 
because it does not deal with biological problems and belongs rather to the 
domain of the semiotics of culture. 
 
Modern Peircean biosemiotics is very different from the symbolic semiotics of 
human language that cyberneticians distanced themselves from many years 
ago. The theories of Heinz von Foerster and Humberto Maturana & Francisco 
Varela have had significant influence on the development of the Copenhagen 
school of biosemiotics. This school focuses mainly on a new interpretation of 
biology and life as having an important communicative aspect to their 
organization. They look at the basically biological aspect of biosemiotics 
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especially as endosemiotics, and its significance for understanding ecological 
and hereditary relations in a non-reductionistic evolutionary view; it opposes 
views like Richard Dawkins’ theory of selfish genes.   
The concept of ‘code’ and ‘coding’ in biosemiotics 
Biosemiotics is the study of signs and signification of cognition and 
communication – also in the form of language - in all living systems. This can 
further be specified as the theory of living systems seen as sign systems as well 
as the study of biological codes. Biosemiotics attempts to integrate the findings 
of biology and semiotics to form a new view of life and meaning as immanent 
features of the natural world and transcends on the one hand the purely 
chemical description of life in molecular biology and on the other hand the 
traditional idea that semiotics is only the study of sign use in the language and 
culture of human beings. Biosemiotics presently considers the simplest system 
that possesses real semiotic competence to be the living cell. It is based on a 
view of the internal as well as external processes between, for instance, protein 
molecules, especially as enzymes, transmitters and hormones - and the 
functions of the various forms of RNA and DNA and their interaction with 
proteins 
 
This goes for single cell organisms such as bacteria or algae as well as a 
member of a tissue or an organ in a multi-cellular organism, be it a tissue like 
muscle fibers, an organ like the liver or a system like the nervous system. One 
can view tissues as distinct bio-communicative systems created through the 
embryological process. In the tradition of Peirce, who founded semiotics as a 
logical and scientific study of dynamic sign action in human and non-human 
nature, biosemiotics attempts to use semiotic concepts to answer questions 
about the biological and evolutionary emergence of meaning, intentionality, and 
a psychical world, based on his three categories. The organism is only partially 
coupled to its environment, and hence is in an ongoing interpretation of it while 
at the same time being constrained in partly unexpected ways.  
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Hoffmeyer (1996 and 2007) therefore talks about the semiotic niche as that part 
of the semiosphere which the genomic lineage has learned to master in order to 
control survival and proliferation of organisms. The behavior of organisms 
represents neither internal “organization” nor external “information” but 
interpretations of one through the other in the phenotype as well as the 
genotype. This cybernetic circularity - or developmental spiraling - over time of 
signification is what Hoffmeyer and Emmeche call code-duality. One could say 
that it is a sort hermeneutic circle or spiral on an evolutionary time scale. 
 
Peircean biosemiotics builds on Peirce’s unique triadic concept of semiosis, 
where the ‘interpretant’ is the sign concept in the organism that makes it 
see/recognize something as an object. The Interpretant is the individual’s 
interpretation of what the outer sign vehicle “stands for” in a motivated context 
by relating to a code that is connected to that specific functionality. 
 
The role of living systems in establishing true semiosis is unclear in Peirce’s 
theory, as are the special biological qualities that allow this to happen. Peirce 
did, however, recognize that chance-spontaneity in nerve cells is “the outward 
aspect of that which within itself is feeling” (Peirce, CP: 265; Santaella Braga 
1999). But a deeper understanding of the concept of coding in a semiotic 
context might help us in the right direction. 
 
The concept of ‘code’ in Peircean biosemiotics 
The term quasi-semiotic objects and processes (Nöth 2002) recognizes that 
systems in nature and culture work with differences, often in the form of coding 
from outside, instead of through either physical causality or meaningful 
semiosis. Systems of Secondness have established an information level above 
the energetic and causal level of nature. This area, delimited from a semiotic 
point of view, is part of what classical first-order cybernetics considers their 
subject area: goal-oriented machines and pattern-forming, self-organized 
processes in nature, based on information. The terms “informational,” “coding,” 
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and “signal” are used mainly in cybernetic contexts for these systems. But 
where one can define ‘information’ and ‘signal’ in a meaning free paradigm, I do 
not find this compatible with the concept of ‘code’. 
 
A code is a set of process rules or habits (for instance how the ribosome works) 
which connect elements in one area (for instance genes) with another area (for 
instance a sequence of amino acids in proteins) in a specific meaning context 
(here the procreation, function, and survival of the cell). Language, of course, 
depends on social and cultural codes. What are biological codes, then? 
Marcello Barbieri (2001) has pointed to the importance of codes in living 
systems such as the genetic code, signal codes for hormones, and between 
nerve cells and nerve cells and muscles, codes for recognition of foreign 
substances and life form in the immune system etc.  
 
Barbieri uses the standard definition of codes as rules of correspondence 
between two independent worlds, as for instance the Morse code standing for 
letters in the alphabet, money standing for purchasing value, the song of a bird 
for its willingness to defend its territory etc. Thus a code gives meaning to 
differences, relations or information in one area relating them to the other in 
certain contexts. Thus pauses in telegraphing using Morse code relate to the 
qualitative difference between the letters in the alphabet. To most 
biosemioticians it is crucial that the correspondence in codes is not a universal 
natural law, but is local and conceptualized or rather motivated from a living 
signifying system. Thus machines do not make codes themselves. A sequence 
of differences such as the base pairs in DNA can be information for coding, but 
is not a code in itself. From Peircean biosemiotics one argue that codes are part 
of triadic sign processes where an interpretant makes the motivated connection 
between objects and signs (representamens). The functioning of living systems 
is based on self-constructed codes. The ribosomal system for building proteins 
uses the base sequence as information for the DNA to determine the amino 
acid sequence in the proteins through the use of messenger RNA and of 
transport RNAs. Barbieri (2001) thus points out that living systems are built of 
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artificially produced code-based molecules from the cells’ molecular assembler 
machine. The cells are therefore not only autopoietic – as pointed out by 
Maturana and Varela - as they produce their own elements and internal 
organization, but also artificial as some of its most vital molecules do not appear 
in the natural world outside living systems.  
 
The Ribosomes are systems that are capable of assembling molecules by 
binding their subunits together in the order provided by a template. Cell proteins 
have the sequences of their amino acids determined by the internal code 
system in the cell between the gene and the ribosome systems. The self-
organized codes of life differentiate living systems from physical, chemical and 
technological systems. Computers do not make their own codes as they 
function causally according to the codes we have made and installed.  The 
structure of living systems, their organization and processes are determined by 
internal codes, and they are therefore in a certain way artificial as they are 
organized by something – local and contextual - in addition to natural laws. The 
proteins in the living cell are different from proteins created through external 
spontaneous chemical processes. Living systems are not natural in the same 
way as physical and chemical systems, because the protein molecules from 
which they are self-constructed are manufactured by molecular machines (the 
Ribosomes and connected processes), as Barbieri points out.  
 
But in his work Barbieri4 claims a third model of semiosis was suggested 
already in the 1980s. It proceeds from biological theory that the cell is a triad of 
genotype, phenotype and ribotype, where the ribotype is the ribonucleoprotein 
system of the cell and represents its “codemaker”, i.e. the seat of the genetic 
code (Barbieri, 1981, 1985, 2003). Thus the cell contains a “codemaker” but not 
an “interpreter”. Barbieri holds that the rules of the genetic code do not depend 
on interpretation from any kind of mind. For Barbieri it is always an act of coding 
that is the origin to semiosis. The first semiotic system in the history of life was 
                                                 
4 The following description of Barbieri’s theory is taken from a long email discussion with him 
attempting to get a deep understanding of this theory and its disciplinary matrix. I try to follow his 
formulations as close as possible. This part of the article is controlled by Barbieri. 
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the apparatus of protein synthesis (the ribotype) and that apparatus does not 
need interpretation because the rules of the genetic code are the same in all 
living systems, he claims. But he also says that we cannot have a sign without a 
meaning, because a sign must signify something, and further we cannot have a 
meaning without a sign because a meaning must be the meaning of something. 
But the meaning is to be sought in the world of objects and their relations in his 
view.  
 
Thus, according to Barbieri’s theory, we have a world of objects that we call 
signs and a world of objects that represent their meanings. Codes are the 
arbitrary (not necessarily physical) connections between them. A semiotic 
system is a system made of two independent worlds that are connected by the 
conventional rules of a code. A semiotic system is constructed by the triad 
signs, meaning, and code.  
 
This is a contrasting view to Peirce’s semiotics, according to which it is made of 
signs (representamens), objects, and interpretants, and these concepts are 
understood as belonging to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness in that order. 
Barbieri works from some kind of biological material worldview, where meaning 
appears in living systems out of a meaningless physical and chemical world 
through coding and then semiosis. It is the rules of a code that create a 
correspondence between signs and meanings. Thus, it is a codemaker who is 
“the agent” that produces the signs, meanings, and conventions. He calls his 
theory “the codemaking model of semiosis”.  
 
In this theory semiosis appeared at the origin of life, and therefore meaning is 
first, and then mind and interpretation came much later, developed on the basis 
of semiotic processes. Thus we can have meaning without interpretation. This 
theory is only based on the mechanisms of evolution consisting of natural 
selection and natural conventions. Moreover, the view that the deep structure of 
the cell is a trinity of genotype, phenotype and ribotype, which is the seat of the 
“makers” (copymakers and codemakers); and the artifact-makers necessarily 
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come before the artifacts, which are the genes and proteins. The theory is then 
based on a possible co-evolution of the genes, the proteins and the ribosomes, 
as is also suggested in Eigen’s hypercycles theories; but in Barbieri’s theory the 
resulting interaction is seen as semiotics producing new ‘designed’ molecules, 
representing a new level of biological meaning. 
 
I agree here from a Peircean point of view, that a sign is an object that is a part 
of some self-reproducing system. A sign is always useful for the system, and its 
value can be determined by its contribution to the reproductive value, survival, 
and/or life joy of the entire system. Semiosis is a crucial part of those processes 
that make systems living entities, and lift them out of the physical world’s 
efficient causality through the informational realm of the formal causality of 
chemistry into the final causation in semiotic processes. The problem is to do 
with the question of what kind of philosophical framework is necessary to 
formulate such a theory in a consistent way. My view is that Barbieri’s  theory is 
not sufficient to explain what he wants to explain, but he wants to retain it to 
avoid the  - from the received view of science – controversial world view of 
Peirce semiotic philosophy, which he – probably with the majority of scientists - 
considers ‘unscientific’. 
 
According to the way Peirce defines these three types of causality, revising 
Aristotle’s concepts: 
1. Efficient causality works through the transfer of energy, and is quantitatively 
measurable. 
2. Formal causality works through pattern fitting bits and with signals as 
information in a dualistic proto-semiotic matter.  
3. Final causation is semiotic signification and interpretation. Codes in living 
systems are correspondences based on final causation, which cannot be 
inferred directly from natural laws as they are viewed in non-semiotic world 
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views such as the mechanical and the complexity and system sciences 
informational views5.  
 
They are based on the formal causation of differences and pattern fitting 
information mostly on the chemical level of interaction. The physical interactions 
are based on laws and efficient causation of energy transfer. But they do not 
have a concept of final causation, though they struggle to define concepts of 
agency and mind emerging in nature through Neo-Darwinian evolution. 
 
Thus from a Peircean biosemiotic view molecules are composed of sequences 
of atoms and make three-dimensional shapes. They interact informational 
through formal causality. Cells then interpret the molecules as coded signs and 
interact with them through final causation in semiosis. Organisms are governed 
by final causality in the sense of their tendency to make habits, and to generate 
future interpretants of the present sign actions. Therefore biosemiotics sees the 
evolution of life and the evolution of semiotic systems as two aspects of the 
same process. But for Barbieri this is done “scientifically”, namely without any 
reference to an inner world of experiences in living systems, but with the idea 
that such a theory can be developed on the basis of this semiotic theory 
(explaining mind and consciousness scientifically). I do not here see any 
significant difference from the information processing paradigm of the cognitive 
sciences, which also hopes to make a theory of mind and consciousness 
without any phenomenological component. I have criticized this paradigm – in 
spite of its being the most accepted view of science – because I think it neglects 
one of our main problems of ever obtaining a coherent theory of consciousness 
and meaning. (Brier 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2001a and c, 2003 a and b, 
2005). 
 
The standard scientific approach to, or the received view of, the origin and 
evolution of life has, from a Peircean view, overlooked the inner qualitative 
aspects of sign action, leading to a reduced picture of causality.  The evolution 
                                                 
5 One would do well in remembering that Peirces concepts are somewhat different from Aristotle’s as 
they function in his semiotic evolutionary and pragmaticistic philosophy. 
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of life is not only based on physical, chemical and even informational 
processes, but on the development of semiotic possibilities, or semiotic freedom 
as Jesper Hoffmeyer  (1996) calls it. It is the evolution of semiotic freedom that 
creates the zoösemiotic system or ‘sign games’ (Brier 1995) that is the primary 
system behind the foundation of human language games and the tertiary 
system of culture as Thomas Sebeok and Marcel Danesi (2000) have pointed 
out in their Modeling Systems Theory.  
 
Subjectivity and meaning are always produced from embodied beings with 
some kind of individuality that orders perception of objects, events and 
possibilities into its own functionality and survival. Sebeok points out that the 
semiosphere, the totality of interconnected signs, is identical with the biosphere 
or - one might add - is a broader and more profound understanding of it. 
Biological systems are then understood as being held together by 
“communicative causality”6, and are therefore not natural kinds in a physical-
chemical sense. They are communicative structures.  
 
Re-interpreting von Uexküll on this basis creates a biosemiotics more suited to 
encompassing the phenomenological aspects of life and cognition with a 
realistic view of nature. Because in Peircean semiotic philosophy, these levels 
can be bound together by Synechism, Tychism, and Agapism, combined with 
an evolutionary view of the interactions between Firstness, Secondness, and 
Thirdness. The view of Firstness as a blend of qualities of mind and matter 
containing qualia and living feeling and a tendency to form habits, is crucial for 
understanding the self-organizing capabilities of nature and how what seems to 
be “dead” matter can, through evolutionary self-organization, become 
autopoietic and alive with cognitive/semiotic and feeling abilities. The embodied 
mind is the overlap between zoösemiotics and anthroposemiotics, and one can 
hope that the conceptualization of the embodied internal intercellular 
                                                 
6 I am aware that this expression has a certain paradigmatic flavor about it, as for many scientist causality 
is only something that can come about through material interactions. This is not so in Peirce’s semiotic 
philosophy, which operates with sufficient, formal and final causation and a theory of semiotic 
interactions in his synechistic ontology. 
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communication dynamics as endosemiotics could bring body and mind to the 
same level.  
 
Still, aspects of the development of embodiment and meaning that von Uexküll 
did not consider  are partially missing. Concepts of the closure, self-
organization, and differentiation of biological, psychological, and social systems 
developed in a second-order cybernetics and autopoiesis theory need to be 
integrated into theories of embodiment, before biosemiotics can also be defined 
as a study of non-conscious semiosis in humans and animals. Niklas Luhmann 
has used Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis theory to create a framework of 
triple autopoiesis, which points to some of the basic problems here, and in my 
opinion also to the solution, if it is integrated into a framework of Peircean 
biosemiotics. I call it Cybersemiotics (Brier 2008). 
 
Luhmann’s Triadic Autopoietic Systems 
Luhmann has generalized the autopoietic concept of Maturana and Varela 
(1980) in order to also comprise psychological thinking systems and socio-
communicative systems. Luhmann (1990) thus operates with three types of 
autopoietic systems: 1. The biological, 2. the psychological and 3. the socio-
communicative. See figure 1 for an illustration. Of those, only the psychic and 
the communication system operates on meaning. But he views the psyche as a 
silent closed system of perception, emotions, thinking and volitions. Thus minds 
or psychic systems do not communicate; only communication communicates. A 
special socio-linguistic system has to be created for communication to happen. 
Communication is again an organizationally closed system. Communication 
systems create their own elements, connect them with each other and with 
action, and develop them further in an evolutionary process.  Social systems 
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To Luhmann (1995) communication is a sequence of selections of differences, 
namely of 1) information, 2) utterance and 3) interpretation or understanding. 
The two first have to be made by what we traditionally call “the sender”, the last 
one by the receiver. Information is constituted by choices related to subject 
matter, utterance is choices pertaining to the way to say something, and 
understanding amounts to the choices of interpretation of the listener depending 
on his evaluation of the human context. S/he chooses an understanding of the 
signs produced, and then one could say that a message is only produced when 
the receiver says something, which the sender chooses to understand as a 
confirmation of some kind of understanding of his first message. Finally, in a 
fourth selection, the message is connected to present practice and accepted as 
worth paying attention to, and initiates communication, stepping into the system. 
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Figure1 : Luhmann’s three autopoietic systems working separately to make 
communication possible, but also using each other as resources by 
interpenetration. “Signification sphere” is the biosemiotic term for von Uexküll’s 
Umwelt and Maturana’s Cognitive domain", reinterpreted here within a Peircean 
biosemiotics. Quoted from Brier 2008. 
 
Although Luhmann’s view of information is loosely based on Bateson’s concept 
of information as ‘a difference that makes a difference’, Luhmann (1990 and 
1995) does not believe in its use outside of human social communication. Thus, 
he does not want to generalize it outside the analysis of human messages. 
Also, Luhmann does not seem to believe that information exists in nature 
independently of human perception. The information concept functions as a 
quantitative aspect within a meaningful human context in a specific utterance 
only. This is how he combines information with aspects of utterance and 
meaning. Luhmann stresses that both the sender and the receiver have to 
make their choices – or sections, as he calls it - to produce a meaningful 
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message. From a Peircean biosemiotic point of view I think that instinctive 
reactions would also count as such a choice, but on a non-conscious level. In 
humans we can decide on the conscious level, whether we want to follow the 
call of our instincts. Further, Luhmann’s theory has problems producing a 
concept of meaning that relates deeply to the flesh, blood, and life (conditions) 
of biological systems, and the existential conditions of human consciousness. 
Here embodied cognitive language philosophy, like Lakoff and Johnson’s 
embodied cognitive semantics combined with ethology, all seen within a 
Peircean biosemiotic framework (Brier 2000a), tell us that signs as concepts 
and classifications arise in our embodied biological and social “life forms”. From 
our inner world we express our bodily experiences in social relations. It is 
especially regarding the social communicative construction of meaning that 
Luhmann’s theory connects so well with semiotics. But Luhmann himself did not 
connect to semiotics in any systematic way. Instead, he attempts to integrate 
Husserl’s phenomenology into his autopoietic system thinking. But I have 
shown elsewhere that in doing so he destroys the very foundation made 
phenomenology work (Brier 2007) and thereby question his system theory of 
meaning from an ontological point of view.. 
 
The Cybersemiotic View of Cognition and Communication 
One way to understand our inner mental world is to see it as a way of 
representing our bodily interactions with the environment through the 
constructions of a felt signification sphere. In this way an individual “point of 
view” as a center of cognition, interest, and interpretation is created. What 
Spinoza calls conatus, self-value and self-interest in preserving the individual’s 
and species’ self-organizing structure is basic to living systems’ ability to signify. 
But this individual signification sphere is again perturbed by the species’ specific 
social interactions starting with mating, rearing of the young, competing for 
hunting territory, and falling in line in the hierarchy of the group, co-operating in 
food gathering and hunting. These social interactive activities first generate sign 
games, and later in evolution, the human language games. 
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The construction or development of meaningful and informative messages has 
as a prerequisite autopoiesis, signification and conatus/motivation/intentionality. 
It is only within this triad that the selections of information, utterance, and 
meaning are possible.  
 
Viewed in this way, Luhmann’s three autopoietic systems (see Luhmann 1990) 
are all needed to create the meaning of a message, and one needs the sign 
concept to understand their interaction. One way of getting out of the impasse 
of Luhmann’s functionalism, where the role of body and mind in the production 
and meaning of social communication has not been adequately grasped by 
theory, is to view the interpenetration between the three organizationally closed 
systems semiotically. Signs acquire meaning where the systems interpenetrate. 
Interpenetration is Luhmann’s term for the interaction between biological 
autopoiesis, psychic closure and the socio-communicative system with its own 
closure at the social level, when they use each other as a resource. 
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Figure 2 : The three levels of communication systems, where the semiotic ones 
are created where the biological and the psychic autopoietic systems 
interpenetrate and where the psychic and the socio-communicative systems 




My theory (Brier 2008a) is thus sign and language games arise on the basis of 
the interpenetration of the three different autopoietic systems. Meaning is seen 
as being generated by the interpenetration of the systems. For example, 
language is a part of the socio-communicative system, but it does not really 
acquire meaning until it interpenetrates with the psychical system, and then 
indicates differences of emotions, volitions, and perceptions; “putting words” to 
our silent inner being. But our cognitive, emotional, and volitional qualities would 
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only have a weak connection to reality if they were not connected to the survival 
of the living systems’ organization as a body through its interaction with the 
environment’s differences and their development of a signification sphere in the 
course of evolution of the species. See figure 2 for an illustration. Still, you can, 
of course, like Luhmann, just study the socio-communicative systems’ 
autopoietic eigen-behavior. But as a transdisciplinary framework for 
communication, cognition and signification it is not satisfying standing alone. 
 
In Brier (2000a), I have shown that ethology and embodied metaphor theory 
have both discovered that the conception of a sign as standing for something to 
somebody in a particular way, is controlled by some releasing mechanisms that 
connect motivation, perception, and behavior/action into one systemic process, 
as Jacob von Uexküll had already described in his “Funktionskreis” and, which 
Heinz von Foerster refers to as perceptual “Eigenvalues”. Instinctually, the 
actual IRM (Innate Release Mechanism) is chosen through the urge coming 
from a specific motivation. This is again based on biological expectancies and 
vital needs, like the need for food and mating. I argue that the linguistic 
motivation, which Lakoff and Johnson claim controls the ICM (Idealized 
Conceptual Models), is connected to the biological motivations in many 
instances. This is obvious in the much-used example where a woman classifies 
a man as a bachelor, and therefore as a potential mating partner. It is our bio-
psychological embodiment that ties these relations together in a cultural and 
linguistic context. 
 
Furthermore, I showed that a phenomenological-emotional concept was 
necessary to understand the production of meaning. I want to point out here 
that this is consistent with Peirce’s defining feeling as an attribute of Firstness. 
In his evolutionary theory, feeling becomes an immanent inner reality, also in 
matter, which manifests more and more as the living systems self-organize with 
the nervous systems that allow an inner (virtual?) mental world to appear. 
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Peirce’s view that we cannot with any good reasons split the concepts of mind 
and matter, as a starting point, is a very sound and a profound foundation for a 
transdisciplinary metaphysical framework. I do not see any good reason why 
the inner world of cognition, emotions and volition should not be accepted as 
just as real as the physical world as well as our cultural world of signs and 
meaning. With Peirce one may say that there will always be some kind of 
psyche in any kind of biological autopoietic and code dual system. Still, a partly 
autonomous inner world of emotions, perceptions and volitions, only seems to 
arise in multi-cellular chordates with a central nervous system. Lorenz (1973) 
argues that such a system with emotions and experiences of pleasure is 
necessary for animals to have appetitive behavior, searching for the objects or 
situations that can elicit their instinctual behavior, and release the motivational 
urge built up behind it. This is qualitatively different from how reflexes function 
on a signal, which is a proto-semiotic informational level. The instinctual sign 
function operates on a genuine semiotic level. 
 
Luhmann’s theory of the socio-communicative being consisting of three levels of 
autopoiesis can be used in Cybersemiotics to distinguish between 1) the 
languaging (Maturana) of the biological systems, which is the coordination of 
coordination of behaviors between individuals of a species on the reflexive 
signal level through mutual structural couplings, 2) the motivation-driven sign 
games of the bio-psychological systems and, finally, 3) the language game level 
of the self-conscious linguistic human through generalized media in the socio-
communicative systems using symbols and grammar. A semiotic understanding 
has thus been added to Luhmann’s conception, and his theory has been placed 
in Peircean triadic metaphysics. In the following section, I will explain and 
develop this further.  
 
Intra-, pheno- and thought semiotics 
In inner world of animals there are emotional and instinctual bio-psychological 
sign games (Brier 1995), which in the human animal function as unconscious 
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paralinguistic signs, such as facial mimics, hand movement gestures, and body 
positions with origins in the evolution of species-specific signification processes 
in living systems. This is where Lorenz’ concept of instinctual drive meets with 
Freud’s Id. But there are alsp endosemiotic parallels to these exosemiotic 
proceses: 
 
The terms endosemiosis and exosemiosis were probably both coined by 
Sebeok (1976, p3), endosemiosis denoting the semiosis that takes place inside 
the organisms, and exosemiosis being the sign process that occurs between 
organisms. Endosemiosis was developed to a common term in semiotic 
discourse by Uexküll et. al. (1993), meaning a semiotic interaction at a purely 
biological level between cells, tissues and organs. Nöth (2001) introduced the 
term ecosemiotics, specifically for the signification process of non-intentional 
signs from the environment or other living beings, which take on a meaning to 
another organism, for instance, to a hunting animal, the scent of prey. Thus the 
sign signifying an organism as a suitable prey is not intentionally emitted by the 
organism preyed on, and is therefore rather ecosemiotic than exosemiotic. 
What can we then call the internal semiotic interaction between the biological 
and the psychological systems? 
 
But when you combine this biosemiotics foundation with Luhmann’s three types 
of autopoisis new levels of semiosis appear to which it is necessary to coin new 
technical terms: 
 
1. The interactions between the psyche and the body are – in my view - internal, 
but not purely biological as in endosemiotics. I call the semiotic aspect of this 
interpenetration between the biological and the psychological autopoiesis 
intrasemiotics (Brier 2000b). Today we know that there are semiotic interactions 
between the hormone systems, the transmitters in the brain and the immune 
system, and that their interactions are very important for the establishment of 
the autopoietic system of the second order, which a multicellular organism 
constructs as a kind of biological self. Its parts are cells that are themselves 
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autopoietic systems and these are again on a new level organized in an 
autopoietic system. The nervous system, the hormonal system, and the immune 
system seem to be incorporated into one big self-organized sign web.  
But we do not have good causal models of the relations between our lived inner 
world of feeling, volitions and intentions, and the biological system. It seems 
that certain kinds of attention on bodily functions, such as imaging, can create 
physiological effects in this combined system. As mentioned above, this is partly 
carried out by different substances that have a sign effect on organs and 
specific cell types in the body (endosemiotics). We also know that our hormonal 
level influences our sexual and maternal responses. Fear turns on a series of 
chemicals that change the state and reaction time of several body functions, 
and so on. This is a very significant part of the embodiment of our mind. 
Intrasemiotics seem to function as meta-patterns of endosemiotic processes. 
For example, our state of mind determines our body posture through the 
tightness of our muscles. There is a subtle interplay between our perceptions, 
thoughts and feelings, and our bodily state, working among other things through 
the reticular activation system. There is still a lot we do not know about the 
interaction between these systems. 
 
2. I then suggest calling the silent inner cognitive, experiental, emotional and 
will-oriented mental processes in their semiotic, but yet non-conceptual or pre-
linguistic states, as they are not yet recognized by conceptual consciousness, 
phenosemiotic processes. For short I just call them phenosemiosis.  
 
3. The interaction between the psyche as phenosemiotics and the linguistic 
system I call thought semiotics. This is where our culture, through concepts and 
the grammatical structure of language, offers us possible classifications, 
orientations and structuralizations of our inner state of feelings, perceptions, 
and volitions. We, for instance, know that the color naming and classification 
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Figure 3 shows in a symbolic way the relationship between endosemiotics and 
the new areas of phenosemiotics, thought semiotics, and intrasemiotics. Quoted 
from Brier 2008. 
 
Now, the autopoietic description of living cybernetic systems with closure does 
not really open for sign production between them in exosemiotics per se, at 
least in Maturana’s conception. Luhmann establishes a theory of 
communication as a closed system of differences of information and meaning, 
but does not produce a theory of signs as such, On the other hand semiotics in 
itself does not reflect very much on the role of embodiment in creating 
signification. Thus, the cybersemiotic suggestion to solve this problem is that 
signs are produced when the systems interpenetrate in different ways. The 
three closed systems produce different kinds of semiosis and signification 
through different types of interpenetration, plus a level of structural couplings 
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and cybernetic “languaging”, as Maturana and Varela (1980) call it. Autopoiesis 
theory underlines that two interpenetrating systems are primarily closed black 
boxes to each other. But interpenetration between them develops a 
coordination of coordination of behavior which Maturana calls languaging. 
These systems are primarily inherited and based on reflexes, and are 
foundational for communication to develop as it is the underlying cognitive 
coupling that is the coordination necessary for communication to develop as a 
signification system with its own organizational closure.  
 
I would, therefore, suggest that we distinguish between languaging and sign 
games at the level between reflexes and instinctual movements (Brier 2000b) 
as already mentioned. Thus, the schooling behavior of fish is reflexive 
informational languaging, but courtship communication is instinctual sign 
games. The perception eliciting reflexes is independent of motivation, whereas 
the perception of sign stimuli is motivation-dependent, which leads into the 
instinctual sign games. Ethologists would here point to how certain instinctual 
movements become ritualized and get a release value for instinctive behavior 
as “sign-stimuli”. Lorenz (1973), in his last period of the theoretical development 
of ethology, realized that emotions had to be connected to the performances of 
instinctual movements to create the motivational urge of appetitive behavior. 
We here see how the connection between signs and internal or 
phenomenological understanding is constructed (Brier 2000b). Lakoff (1987), 
and Lakoff and Johnson (1998) have shown us how this basic mechanism of 
bodily meaning can be explained, by metaphorical processes, in order to 
encompass socially and culturally produced signs. 
 
Sign games are developed into language games through evolution and in the 
life of the infant human. As we are born and grow into human social 
communication the psyche is perfused with signs. Our mind is infected with 
language and we become semiotic cyborgs or what we call humans. We are in 
this view born as animals with a capacity to construct this interpenetration 
between the psychical and socio-communicative systems, creating internal 
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interpretants that are meaningful to us because of the mutual structural 
couplings of languaging established in evolution. 
 
Finally, we will look at the organism’s perceptual connections to the 
environment, creating its signification sphere. With Nöth and Kull (2001) we call 
this signification aspect eco-semiotics. Realizing that a signification sphere not 
only pertains to the environment, but also to the perception of other members of 
the species in cultural and proto-cultural behavior, as well as to perceptions of 
own “mind-and-body-hood”, I use a little “eco” as a prefix to the signification 
sphere, when it is the aspect of it pertaining especially to non-intentional nature 
and culture outside the species in question. In both inanimate nature, as well as 
in other species and in cultural processes, we can observe differences that 
signify meaning to us, although never intended by the object. 
 
This is also true for the human species, indicating that our language has a deep 
inner connection to the ecology of our culture. Any existing culture is collective 
ways of making a social system survive ecologically. As such, the 
Cybersemiotic theory of mind, perception, and cognition is a realistic one, but 
not a materialistic or mechanistic one. It builds on an inner semiotic connection 
between living beings, nature, culture and consciousness carried by the three 
Peircean categories in a synechistic and tychistic ontology in an agapistic 
theory of evolution, delivering a philosophy going beyond the dualistic 
oppositions between idealism (or spiritualism) and materialism (or mechanism). 
 
Based on the concept relations described, we can go back and now see that the 
linguistic motivation, mentioned earlier, must be placed in the area of thought-
semiotics where our internal non-linguistic phenosemiotic processes of mind 
meet with the concepts of language and imbue them with inner meaning, 
whereas the animal motivation stems from the intrasemiotic area where the 
endosemiotic processes of the body cells meet with the phenosemiotic 
processes of mind and awareness. Thus body, mind and language have been 
encompassed by a shared framework able to conceptualize their interactions on 
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the same process level, but now integrating concepts of meaning and qualia. 
This gives us hope that the Cybersemiotic development of biosemiotics can 
contribute to a new inter- and transdisciplinary semiotic theory of mind, 
cognition, communication and consciousness (Brier 2008a). 
 
As Barbieri senses, then, Peirce’s semiotic, evolutionary and synechistic theory 
changes our view of nature and reality and therefore of science and knowledge 
processes (knowing) as such in a way that also leads into reconsidering the 
relation between science and religion and therefore between the concepts of 
nature and the sacred. It will take too much space to develop these points here, 
but I have described and compared the reformulation attempts from the two big 
interdisciplinarians: Gregory Bateson and C.S. Peirce in Brier (2008b). It must 
here be enough to say that both Peircean biosemiotics and cybersemiotics 
develops a transdisciplinary philosophical foundation for biology and the 
sciences of non-living nature that unite them with the humanities and social 
sciences - not on the basis of a physicalistic or even informational reductionism, 





1. Signs are the basic units for the study of life.  
2. Peircean semiotics is most useful as the foundation of developing 
biosemiotics because it has a theory of signification of non-intentional 
signs, and a realistic, pragmatic, and evolutionary philosophical 
framework. 
3. On the level of animal cognition and communication, biosemiotics is 
already prefigured in Jakob von Uexküll's Umweltlehre and Lorenz and 
Tinbergen’s ethology, which Thomas Sebeok used to found 
zoösemiotics. But biosemiotics goes further. 
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4. Biosemiotics encompasses all living systems from bacteria, fungi, plants 
and animals to humans as sign producers and interpreters.  
5. Biosemiotics further encompasses endosemiotics between the cells of 
multicellular organisms. 
6. Though the living systems are a part of both the physical and the 
chemical world and have to work within the frames of their laws, life is 
primary functioning within the realms of codes. 
7. Codes are mappings between different areas of reality within a specific 
context and a specific purpose. They are an important part of making 
sign relations in living systems. 
8. Living systems are – amongst other things - defined by the so called 
code-duality, which is a looped interaction between a digital code in the 
genotype and an analogue one in the phenotype. The gene is a code for 
memory and self-representation, and the individual living body is a code 
for action and interaction with the real world and its ecology.  
9. Thus life appears to be a communicative interplay of different types of 
self- and other- descriptions carried by molecules in the single cell 
organism and endosemiotically, and by sound, smell, tactility and vision 
in multicellular organisms with nervous systems.  
10. The essential question for the current debate about the possibility of a 
transdisciplinary information/signification science is whether Peircean 
biosemiotics can comprise un-interpreted “natural objects,” dissipative 
structures, and other spontaneous generations of order and patterns in 
nature as signs. These objects were previously described in physico-
chemical terms. Now some adherents of the pan-informational paradigm, 
such as Stonier (1997), want to explain them in purely informational 
terms. From a Peircean view, these phenomena are protosemiotic, or 
quasi-semiotic, when compared to the semiosis of living systems, 
because they are only displays of Secondness (Nöth 2002). This is not 
the discussion of whether any natural thing can become a sign when 
placed in a meaningful context by a living system, but whether the 
objects and their processes are signs per se.  
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11. There is a lot of work to do for serious philosophy, considering how many 
central philosophical topics of mind, language, epistemology, and 
metaphysics are affected by the biosemiotic and cybersemiotic 
development. We have dealt with some of them in arguing for the 
pragmaticistic triadic semiotics of Peirce over all other approaches based 
on linguistics, semiology, structuralism, semantics and communicational 
ethics. 
12. Biosemiotics is one of the most promising reconceptualizations of the 
truth-seeking enterprise of science and its relation to the concepts of 
function, purpose and meaning coming from the humanities and social 
sciences.  
13. According to Kuhn’s paradigm theory, the development of specific 
methods is an important part of the disciplinary matrix. Biosemiotics has 
progressed into developing new definitions of concepts, new values of 
biological research and a new worldview and epistemology. But the 
empirical and methodological aspects need to be developed, and 
practical and testable results gained from the work in order to get this 
new transdisciplinary paradigm to be taken seriously also within the 
sciences. It is well established in semiotics, bio-philosophy and 
information philosophy and in some linguistic, cultural and social studies. 
The final test is whether it can offer something the sciences actually want 
enough to leave their present frozen position to enter into the new 
reformulation of the relation between the humanities, natural and social 
sciences. What kinds of methods can the biosemiotic perspective add to 
traditional biology? Can biosemiotics make new empirical discoveries, or 
is it just a reconceptualization of the already known? These are crucial 
questions to answer. 
14. Biosemiotics is further developed in Cyber(bio)semiotics to include 
computers, information theory and science, as well as cybernetics and 
embodied sign- and language games in culture. Concepts of the closure, 
self-organization, and differentiation of biological, psychological, and 
social systems developed in a second-order cybernetics and autopoiesis 
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theory are further integrated into with biosemiotics into what Brier (2001, 
2003, 2008a) calls Cybersemiotics.   
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